Item number: A4662-2、A4662-1

Year: AD 1893

Material: Iron Alloy

The results after XRF testing (A4662-2)

The results after XRF testing (A4662-1)

Size: 38.5 x 38.5 x 40.2 mm (M4662-2); 38.5 x 38.5 x 41.0 mm (M4662-1)

Weight: 384.95 g (M4662-2); 389.4 g (M4662-1)

Provenance: Fuchin Coin 2008

This is a pair of dies for the one-yen silver coin issued by the Empire of Japan in the 26th year of Meiji (AD 1893).

The working face of each die presents a mirror image of the struck coin. On the obverse die, the denomination is rendered in a central vertical column of two kanji characters, “一圓” (one yen). Flanking this are decorative branches of paulownia and chrysanthemum leaves woven into a wreath, bound with a ribbon knot where they cross at the base. Positioned directly at the top is the imperial chrysanthemum crest, symbolising the Japanese Emperor.

The reverse die features a circular beaded border enclosing a central coiled dragon with an open mouth baring its teeth—a motif colloquially termed “A-ryū”. Inscribed along the lower periphery in Latin characters is the English denomination “ONE YEN”, flanked by “416”, denoting the gross weight in grains, and “900”, signifying a silver fineness of nine hundred thousandths (matching the prevailing Mexican silver dollar). Across the upper periphery runs the kanji legend indicating the state title, “Dai Nippon” (Great Japan), alongside the regnal year of issue, “Meiji 26”. Both the obverse and reverse designs were executed by the master metalworker Kanō Natsuo.

The two dies used for striking the obverse and reverse are virtually identical in structural form aside from their working faces. Encircling the outer edge of each die face is a recessed groove termed the rim cavity or rim gutter, into which the blank’s metal is extruded under striking pressure to produce the raised protective rim of the coin. Extending between the edge of the die face and the die neck is a minute bevelled facet, or chamfer, designed to reduce edge-stress concentrations during coining and thereby mitigate the risk of perimeter chipping or cuds. Below this chamfer lies the die neck, a slightly narrowed, cylindrical collar. Beneath the neck is the die shoulder, which flares gradually to the full width of the die shank. The shank itself is a heavy, solid cylinder engineered to absorb the coining impact, featuring lateral grooves that, in conjunction with the circular aperture at the base, provide a keyed mortise-and-tenon interlocking mechanism to secure the die firmly within the coining press.

Typological variations of the one-yen silver coin are distinguished primarily by subtle stylistic differences in the inscription “416”: the numeral “1” evolved over successive mintings and is broadly categorised into groups spanning the 7th and 8th years of Meiji (AD 1874–1875), a subset of the 8th year and the 11th to 19th years of Meiji (AD 1875 and AD 1878–1886), and the 20th year of Meiji to the 3rd year of Taishō (AD 1887–1914). In addition, based on the vertical position of the kanji numeral “four” (四) in the date relative to the outer denticles, the coinage is divided into major varieties such as the “dropped four” (kōshi) type, in which the character sits noticeably low and abuts the rim denticulation, and the standard “regular” type. In the 26th year of Meiji (AD 1893), a total of 10,403,477 one-yen silver coins were struck.

During the Edo period, Japan established a trimetallic monetary regime in which gold, silver, and copper coexisted concurrently, with silver circulating predominantly across western Japan, such as the Kansai region, as uncoined currency measured by weight. Following the opening of the treaty ports in the Bakumatsu era and the conclusion of the Tariff Convention of Keiō 2 (AD 1866), the Tokugawa shogunate and the subsequent Meiji government confronted an urgent necessity to overhaul this disordered monetary system to facilitate foreign trade and align with international standards. At that time, the Mexican silver dollar (yōgin) functioned as the ubiquitous settlement currency throughout the East Asian commercial sphere. Consequently, advisers to the Meiji government, notably John Robertson, Yokohama manager of the Oriental Bank Corporation, and Thomas William Kinder, director of the Imperial Mint, urged Japan to adapt to these regional circumstances by instituting a silver monometallic standard based on a coin identical in weight and fineness to the Mexican dollar. Although the Meiji administration formally notified foreign legations in Meiji 2 (AD 1869) of its decision to adopt a silver standard, Itō Hirobumi, then Junior Vice-Minister of Finance investigating American financial institutions, fervently argued that the Western powers were moving towards gold or limping bimetallic standards, and that Japan ought to adopt these advanced institutions. To reconcile the theoretical ideals of the gold standard with the entrenched reality of silver circulation across East Asia, the Meiji government promulgated the New Currency Act (Shinka Jōrei) in May of Meiji 4 (AD 1871). This legislation formally declared a gold monometallic standard, yet permitted the minting of a trade-orientated one-yen silver coin restricted to the treaty ports under its supplementary articles, thereby creating an anomalous double system characterised by a nationwide gold standard and a local bimetallic standard within the treaty ports.

Under the New Currency Act, a one-yen gold coin containing 1.5 grammes of pure gold was designated as the standard unit, whereas the one-yen silver coin, struck exclusively for external trade, was mandated to possess a gross weight of 416 grains and a pure silver content of 374.4 grains at nine hundred thousandths fineness—rendering it identical in weight and purity to the Mexican dollar. However, Chinese native banks (qianzhuang) and East Asian merchants, harbouring deep-seated distrust stemming from the debased recoinages of the late shogunate, refused to grant the Japanese coin the same creditworthiness as the Mexican dollar; instead, they routinely traded it at a discount of 0.5 to 1.5 per cent and defaced the coins by applying commercial chopmarks. In an attempt to overcome this disadvantage and compete with the newly introduced American trade dollar, the Meiji government decreed in February of Meiji 8 (AD 1875) that the weight of the one-yen silver coin be augmented by four grains to 420 grains, officially designating it as the “Trade Dollar” (Bōekigin). However, this heavier issue precipitated the operation of Gresham’s law: because its intrinsic bullion value surpassed that of both the Mexican dollar and the earlier one-yen piece, neither foreign nor domestic merchants brought silver bullion to the mint for conversion, choosing instead to melt down or hoard the heavier coins. Exacerbated by contradictory official regulations requiring the old and new trade coins to exchange at par, the total mintage of the Trade Dollar remained minuscule, preventing its broad adoption. Recognising that the heavier coin had failed to supplant the Mexican dollar, the government finally suspended the production of the 420-grain Trade Dollar in November of Meiji 11 (AD 1878) and revived the striking of the 416-grain one-yen coin.

Concurrently, during the AD 1870s, European powers led by Germany embraced the gold standard and demonetised substantial quantities of silver, whilst the Latin Monetary Union restricted silver minting. This resulted in a sustained collapse in global silver prices, creating an acute divergence between Japan’s statutory bimetallic ratio and the market ratio in London. This market discrepancy triggered a classic manifestation of Gresham’s law, causing Japan’s high-grade gold coinage to drain rapidly overseas; simultaneously, the outbreak of the Satsuma Rebellion forced the government and national banks to issue massive amounts of inconvertible paper money, inducing severe monetary dislocation. To combat the loss of specie and the depreciation of fiat currency, the Meiji administration issued Decrees No. 12 and No. 13 in May of Meiji 11 (AD 1878), revoking the territorial restrictions that had confined the one-yen silver coin to treaty ports and elevating it to unlimited legal tender alongside gold for the payment of taxes and all public and private debts. This decision formally transformed Japan’s nominal gold standard into a de jure bimetallic system, though with gold coins having disappeared from circulation and the domestic market mediated entirely by silver and paper, the nation effectively operated on a de facto silver standard. Subsequently, Minister of Finance Matsukata Masayoshi introduced a rigorous deflationary programme to retire and destroy inconvertible paper notes and accumulate silver specie reserves. Following the establishment of the Bank of Japan in Meiji 15 (AD 1882), silver-convertible banknotes were officially issued in May of Meiji 18 (AD 1885) under the Convertible Banknotes Act, achieving parity between convertible paper currency and the silver yen and entrenching a silver-based monetary regime.

By the third decade of the Meiji era, the worldwide collapse in silver prices intensified markedly, exacerbated by the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act in the United States in AD 1890 and the suspension of free silver coinage in British India in AD 1893. This precipitated a precipitous fall in international silver values, causing a steep decline in Japan’s silver-yen exchange rates, surging domestic commodity prices, burgeoning fiscal outlays, and widespread disruption to overseas trade. In response to this crisis, Minister of Finance Watanabe Kunitake petitioned in September of Meiji 26 (AD 1893) for the creation of the Currency System Investigation Commission, assembling officials, academics, and financial luminaries to debate the potential demonetisation of silver (gin haika ron). Reformers within the Ministry of Finance, led by Sakatani Yoshirō and Soeda Juichi, argued forcefully for demonetising silver, contending that bimetallism was merely an unstable alternating standard and that, with modern industrialised economies adhering to gold, Japan had to adopt a gold monometallic standard to stabilise its currency and assimilate into global financial networks. Conversely, opponents spearheaded by business leader Shōda Heigorō and economist Taguchi Ukichi vigorously defended bimetallism, arguing that a depreciated silver currency acted as an export bounty and a protective tariff for Japanese agriculture and manufacture, and that a premature transition to gold would severely handicap fledgling modern industries and provoke acute domestic instability. When the Commission presented its final report in July of Meiji 28 (AD 1895), a majority endorsed the adoption of the gold standard, though the immense gold reserves required for its implementation remained an insurmountable obstacle under the state’s prevailing finances.

This decisive bottleneck in gold reserves was subsequently resolved following Japan’s victory in the First Sino-Japanese War and the receipt of an indemnity of 200 million taels under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The Japanese government stipulated that the Qing court pay the indemnity not in silver bullion, but converted from Kuping taels into British pounds sterling in gold coin, thereby securing an abundant foundation of gold reserves. Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Matsukata Masayoshi seized this historic opportunity, officially promulgating the Currency Act in March of Meiji 30 (AD 1897) and establishing a definitive gold standard effective from 1 October of that year, thereby terminating the standard monetary status of silver. To prevent disruptions to commodity prices and existing loan contracts, the new statute halved the pure gold content of the one-yen unit from 1.5 grammes to 0.75 grammes, aligning it precisely with the prevailing market ratio of approximately 1:32 between gold and the silver yen on the London market and ensuring an orderly transition in the measure of value. Under the Currency Act, the free coinage of the one-yen silver coin was abolished; existing silver yen were demonetised and subjected to a mandatory redemption period for gold coin, permanently relegating silver to limited-tender subsidiary coinage. Although the silver yen continued to circulate temporarily in overseas possessions such as Taiwan and Korea—where it was countermarked with a circular “Gin” (marugin) stamp to accommodate established commercial custom—this practice was discontinued around Meiji 31 (AD 1898) due to market confusion and discounting. Accompanied by the earlier withdrawal, melting, and recoinage of traditional Bakumatsu cast-copper coinage such as Tenpō Tsūhō and Bunkyū Eihō, alongside the widespread adoption of modern fractional coins, Japan successfully dismantled the legacy of East Asia’s traditional uncoined silver and base-metal monetary frameworks, establishing a modern currency system fully integrated with those of the Western powers.

物件編號: A4662-2、A4662-1

年代: 公元 1893 年

材質: 鐵合金

XRF分析結果 (A4662-2)

XRF分析結果 (A4662-1)

尺寸: 38.5 x 38.5 x 40.2 mm (M4662-2); 38.5 x 38.5 x 41.0 mm (M4662-1)

重量: 384.95 g (M4662-2); 389.4 g (M4662-1)

來源: 福君錢幣 2008

這是一對明治二十六年（公元1893年），大日本帝國所發行銀幣的模具，面額一圓。

模面為該幣成品的鏡像。刻有錢幣正面的模面，中央豎列漢字「一圓」，是為面額。左右兩側以桐葉和菊葉編織的葉冠作為裝飾，交錯處以繩結繫起。錢幣正上方是象徵天皇的菊紋。

錢幣背面模面有一道珠圈，正中央是一條飛龍，張口露齒，因而被暱稱為「阿竜」。錢幣下緣以環列英文「ONE YEN」，即面額「一圓」，兩側「416」表示所含銀重，「900」則表示含銀量為千分之九百，於流行的墨西哥銀元相同。上緣環列漢字國號「大日本」，和發行年份「明治二十六年」。正背面圖樣均為金工大家加納夏雄所設計。

壓印正背面的兩個模具，形制除模面外基本一致。其模面外緣均有一圈凹溝，稱為緣槽（Rim Gutter / Rim Cavity），金屬受擠壓流入此溝槽後，形成錢幣外側凸起的保護邊環（Rim）。模面邊緣延伸至模頸之間，有一的微小的傾角削面，稱為倒角（Bevel / Chamfer），有助於在壓印時降低邊緣應力集中，減少邊緣崩裂（Cud）的風險。模頸則位於倒角下方，為稍作收窄或延伸的短圓柱段。模頸下方為模肩，稍微傾斜並擴增至模身的寬度。模身則為厚重的圓柱，為承受衝擊的主體，側邊則有凹槽，與模座端的圓孔一同提供固定於機械上的榫卯結構。

一圓銀幣在版式特徵上的差異，主要在於幣面「416」字樣的細節：其數字「1」的字型會隨鑄造年代演變，依發行年號大致分為「明治7、8年」、「明治8年部分版式與明治11至19年」，以及「明治20年至大正3年」等；此外，依據年號數字「四」相對於幣邊的位置高低，亦區分為「四」的位置明顯偏下且緊鄰外緣齒邊的「降四型」，以及刻印位置常規的「普通型」等主要版別。明治二十六年（公元1893年），發行一圓銀幣共10,403,477枚。

日本在江戶時代確立了金、銀、銅三貨自由並行的貨幣體制，其中銀幣長期在關西等地區作為依重量計價的稱量貨幣流通。隨著幕末開港與慶應二年（公元1866年）《改稅約書》的簽訂，幕府與後續的明治新政府面臨必須改革舊有紊亂幣制，以利對外貿易與國際貨幣接軌的迫切需求。當時東亞貿易圈普遍以墨西哥銀圓（洋銀）作為國際貿易的共通結算貨幣，明治政府顧問東洋銀行支配人羅伯遜（J. Robertson）與造幣寮首長金德（T. W. Kinder）等人因而建議日本應順應東亞實際經濟環境，建立以同等品位量目之銀幣為本位貨幣的銀本位制。明治政府雖在明治二年（公元1869年）一度通告各國公使採行銀本位案，但隨後赴美考察幣制的大藏少輔伊藤博文強烈建言歐美列國已走向金本位或跛行本位，日本應取法西方先進制度。為了在理想的金本位學說與東亞深植銀貨體系的現實之間取得妥協，明治政府於明治四年（公元1871年）五月頒布《新貨條例》，正式宣告採用金本位制，但同時在附則中允許開港場鑄造貿易用的一圓銀幣，形成了實質上全國為金本位、開港場為金銀複本位的雙重制度。

在《新貨條例》體系下，純金量1.5公克的一圓金幣被定為原貨，而專門用於對外貿易的一圓銀幣則規定總重416格令、含純銀374.4格令，成色為千分之九百，與墨西哥銀圓等位等量。然而，東亞與中國市場上的錢莊與商賈基於歷史上幕末劣幣改鑄的不信任，並未給予一圓銀幣與墨西哥鷹洋同等的信用，反而常在交易中施加百分之零點五至一點五的貼水折價，甚至在幣面打上各家商號的莊印。為了擺脫對洋銀的劣勢並抗衡美國發行的貿易銀幣，明治政府於明治八年（公元1875年）二月公布將一圓銀幣增重四格令至420格令，並正式定名為「貿易銀」。這批增量貿易銀的推出反而引發了格雷欣法則的作用，由於新貿易銀的貴金屬價值高於同額洋銀與舊銀幣，外商與民間不願持銀地金委託造幣寮鑄幣，反而傾向將重銀熔化或充作地金，加之政府維持新舊貿易銀等價兌換的矛盾規定，致使貿易銀鑄造量極為有限且難以普及。眼見增量貿易銀無法達成驅逐洋銀的目標，政府終在明治十一年（公元1878年）十一月下令停止鑄造420格令貿易銀，重新恢復416格令之一圓銀幣。

與此同時，公元1870年代以德國為首的歐洲諸國紛紛走向金本位並拋售白銀，加上拉丁貨幣同盟限制銀幣鑄造，導致國際銀價持續暴跌，法定金銀比價與倫敦市場比價嚴重脫節。這種市場比價的劇變引發劣幣驅逐良幣現象，日本國內優良的本位金幣大量流往海外，加上西南戰爭爆發使得政府與國立銀行巨額增發不換紙幣，造成幣值劇烈動盪。面對正貨流失與紙幣貶值，明治政府於明治十一年（公元1878年）五月發布第十二號與第十三號布告，取消貿易一圓銀幣僅限於開港場流通的地域限制，明定其與金幣同等具備無限法償資格，可用於納稅及一切公私支付。這項舉措標誌著日本形式上的金本位制正式轉向金銀複本位制，而在金幣匿跡、市場唯銀貨與紙幣流通的實態下，日本已徹底落入事實上的銀本位體系。隨後大藏卿松方正義推行財政緊縮政策，整理銷毀不換紙幣、蓄積白銀正貨，並於明治十五年（公元1882年）創設日本銀行，繼而在明治十八年（公元1885年）五月依據《兌換銀行券條例》正式發行銀貨兌換紙幣，使銀兌換券與銀圓平價流通，牢固確立了日本以銀為核心的本位體制。

進入明治二十年代後，國際銀價跌勢更形劇烈，特別是公元1890年，美國廢止謝爾曼購銀法案以及公元1893年，英屬印度停止白銀自由鑄造，致使國際銀價呈斷崖式下跌，導致日本的銀圓外匯匯率劇降、國內物價暴漲、財政支出擴增與對外貿易嚴重紊亂。面對此一危機，大藏大臣渡邊國武於明治二十六年九月奏請設立「貨幣制度調查會」，召集官員、學者與財界代表，針對是否變革現行銀貨制度展開了激烈的「銀廢貨論」大辯論。以大藏省委員阪谷芳郎與添田壽一為代表的改革派力主銀廢貨，指出複本位制實為脆弱的替代本位制，且世界經濟主流已由文明先進的金本位國主導，日本唯有採行金單本位制方能穩定幣值並融入國際貿易金融網絡。相對地，以財界代表莊田平五郎與學者田口卯吉為首的反對派則力主維持金銀複本位制，認為銀價下跌宛如對本國農工商業提供出口獎勵與保護關稅，一旦貿然廢銀改金，將重創剛起步的近代工業並引發國內經濟劇烈動盪。明治二十八年（公元1895年）調查會最終報告出爐，雖有多數委員贊成邁向金本位，但考量到實施金本位必須具備龐大的黃金儲備，在當時的財政條件下仍被視為難以遽然推行的目標。

這項關鍵的黃金儲備瓶頸，隨後因日本在日清戰爭（甲午戰爭）中獲勝並於《馬關條約》取得兩億兩白銀賠償而迎刃而解，日本政府要求清廷，將該賠償以庫平銀折合英鎊金幣形式支付，從而獲得了充裕的黃金基礎。首相兼大藏大臣（相當於財政部長）松方正義抓住此歷史機遇，於明治三十年（公元1897年）三月正式公布《貨幣法》，自同年十月一日起實施徹底的金本位制，終結了銀幣的本位地位。為避免物價與既有借貸契約產生動盪，新法將一圓金幣的含金量由原先的1.5公克直接減半至0.75公克，使其精確對應當時一圓銀幣在倫敦市場約一比三十二的市價比價，實現了價值尺度的平穩過渡。在《貨幣法》體系下，一圓銀幣的自由鑄造遭到廢止，舊有一圓銀幣自此停止通用並限期兌換金幣，銀貨被徹底降格為法償能力受限的輔幣。儘管在台灣與朝鮮等海外屬地，一圓銀幣因民間慣用仍短暫被准許打蓋「丸銀」戳印後過渡流通，但因市場辨識紛擾很快於明治三十一年前後中止。伴隨著更早之前對幕末天保通寶、文久永寶等傳統銅錢的整理熔鑄與新式輔幣的普及，日本成功擺脫了東亞傳統的稱量與賤金屬幣制遺緒，建立與西方列強完全接軌的近現代貨幣體系。